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Forward letter from  the Secretary-General of 
O.E.C.D.  to the Secretary-General of the  UNCTAD 
In accordance with the undertaking given in the UNCTAD 
by the developed market  economy  countries during tne third 
session of the Special Committee  on Preferences,  the Council 
of the  O.EoC.D.  has instructed me  to forward to you  the 
attached substantive documentation on the question of 
preferences as  a  basis for consultations with the developing 
countries. 
This documentation is complementary to that which this 
Organisation forwarded to the  UNCTAD  in January,  1968  and 
which was  distributed at the New  Delhi Conference under the 
reference TD/56. 
Accept,  Sir,  the assurances of my  highest consideration z-/- 3  -
TARIFF  PREFERENCES 
FOR  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
DOCUMENTATION  FORWARDED  BY 
O.E.C.D.  TO  UNCTAD 
I.  Introduction 
C(69)142 
l.  In accordance  with the procedure  adopted  by the  UNCTAD 
Special  Committee  on Preferences at its third session in July, 
1969,  the  developed market  economy  countries were  to pursue their 
exchanges  of views  actively in the  O.E.C.D.  during the  summer  in 
order to  be  able to present the  UNCTAD  Secretariat with substantive 
documentation  on  the question of preferences before 15th November. 
It was  agreed that this documentation would  contain all the detailed 
information available at that time  in order to facilitate  a  rapid 
study by  the developing  countries,  and that it would  deal with  the 
various  aspects  of the generalised non-discriminatory and  non-
reciprocal  system of  preferences~  as  had  been decided in Resolu-
tion 21  (II)  of the  Conference(l;.  It is to meet this undertaking 
that the present report  is being  addressed to the  UNCTAD  Secretariat 
on behalf of the  developed  O.E.C.D.  Member  countries,  and  of 
New  Zealand which  has  been associated in the  work  of the  O.E.C.D. 
on preferences. 
2.  In presenting this documentation it should be  recalled that 
the  O.E.C.D.  Member  countries have  already  expressed agreed  views 
on the question of preferences at the  New  Delhi Conference,  in 
the report circulated to the  UNCTAD  under reference  TD/56.  It 
was  agreed at the  time  by  the  O.E.C.D.  Council that the  main 
lines of that report would  be  used  as  a  common  basis for  the 
Delegations  of Member  Governments  at the  Conference  and  in the 
course  of future  discussions  on  the question.  This  is what  has 
been done,  and  the  agreed views  expressed  in that report,  even 
if they are not all repeated in detail below,  continue  to reflect 
on the whole the  way  in which  the  O.E.C.D.  countries  intend to 
deal with  the question of  a  mutually acceptable  system  of 
generalised preferences. 
3.  However,  as  was  indicated in the  introductory letter to 
document  TD/56,  various  important  questions  relating to the 
arrangements  necessary for special tariff treatment had still 
to  be  resolved.  The  Ministers  invited the  O.E.C.D.  to continue 
studying these  problems  in the  light of the  views  expressed by 
the  developing  countries.  The  Organisation has  worked  on this 
question since that time.  In the  course of their preparatory 
work,  the  countries  which  envisage granting preferences have 
taken into account  as  far  as  possible the  views  expressed by 
the  developing  countries both at the  New  Delhi  Conference  and 
subsequently. 
(l)  Cf.  the report of the Special Committee  on  Preferences  on 
its third session  - document  TD/B/262,  paragraph 2l(i)  to 
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4.  Among  the countries  which  are  either Members  of the  O.E.C.D. 
or have  been associated with its work  in the field of preferences, 
the  following  18 countries  envisage  taking part as  donors  in the 
generalised system  of preferences:  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada, 
Denmark,  Finland,  France,  the Federal Republic  of Germany,  Ireland, 
Italy,  Japan,  Luxembourg,  the Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway, 
Sweden,  Switzerland,  the United Kingdom  and the  United States. 
5.  As  regards  the  Member  States of the  European Economic 
Community,  it is the  E.E.C.  as  such which acts  in this matter by 
virtue of the Treaty of Rome.  In addition,  four  Nordic  countries, 
Denmark,  Finland,  Norway  and  Sweden1  have  decided to put  forward  a 
joint submission. 
6.  The  Icelandic authorities consider that Iceland is not at 
present able to give preferential treatment to developing  countries 
because  of the  very special structure of its economy  and the 
persistent difficulties which affect international trade  in those 
products  essential to its foreign trade. 
7.  Within as  concerted an  approach as possible,  each donor 
country nonetheless reserves the  right of taking action appropriate 
to its own  possibilities and taking  account  of certain features 
of its particular circumstances. 
8.  In order to make  progress  in finding  and  defining  concrete 
solutions,  the  bodies  of the  O.E.C.D.  responsible for these 
questions  have  followed  the procedure  which  the  spokesman  of 
Group  B had the  occasion to define before the Special  Committee 
on  Preferences  at its second  and third sessions,  namely that 
prospective preference-granting countries  would prepare 
two  indicative lists of products;  a  negative list covering 
Chapters  25-99  of the Brussels Nomenclature,  and  a  positive list 
covering  Chapters  l-24 of the  Nomenclature.  The  lists were  to 
be  accompanied  by  a  description of all the  assumptions,  qualifica-
tions  and  conditions  on which the grant of preferences  could be 
considered and  on the basis of which  the lists had been prepared. 
These  submissions  were  to  be  exchanged within the  O.E.C.D.  and 
subsequently to  serve  as  a  basis for  detailed exchanges  of views. 
The  submissions  tabled at that stage were  to  be  illustrative in 
as  much  as  each prospective  donor  country would  wish  to be  able 
to  reyiew the lists and the  assumptions  on  which  they were  based. 
9.  For  a  variety of reasons,  this programme  of work  was  not 
completed:  this is explained in part by the delays  in the 
presentation of submissions  and  by recent modifications  made  in 
some  of them  which  may  have  far-reaching  implications.  Moreover, 
the  subject matter is of  some  complexity,  in view of the particular 
problems  which  the  introduction of a  mutually acceptable  system 
of generalised preferences raises for  each  donor  country.  Finally, 
considerable  conceptual differences  exist between the various 
approaches.  Therefore,  the  information given below is incomplete. 
It is only provisional  and  may  be  modified.  It nevertheless 
contains  the detailed  information available at this time  as  was 
agreed by  the  Special  Committee  on  Preferences  of the  UNCTAD 
at its third session.  On  this basis,  detailed consultations - 5  - C(69)142 
can take place  in the  UNCTAD  with the  developing  countries,  and 
donor  countries  can continue their work  ih the  O.E.C.D.,  and  move 
toward early introduction of a  mutually acceptable  system of 
generalised preferences.  It is in this spirit that they have 
prepared the  documentation  contained in the present report. 
10.  Each  of the preferential  schemes  presented in the various 
submissions  forms  a  whole:  in fact,  their characteristics have 
been carefully weighed  as parts of balanced unities.  This  is 
why  there is  a  risk involved in picking  out certain features  of 
the various  schemes  in order to  compare  them  in isolation.  Such 
analytical comparison of the various  schemes  is open to methodo-
logical criticism.  On  the  other hand  a  comparison  as  entities 
of the  schemes  proposed is extremely difficult to carry out  in 
practice.  Despite the  disadvantages  and  dangers  in the analytical 
approach,  it has nevertheless  appeared useful to concentrate  on  the 
key  elements  in the various  schemes  and thus to  compare  the  solutions 
appearing  in the different  schemes. 
11.  The  prospective  donor  countries were  of the  opinion 
that their individual  submissions  form  an  important part of the 
substantive  documentation to be  submitted to the  UNCTAD.  These 
submissions  are  annexed to this document  and  should be  read in 
conjunction with it. 
II.  Principal characteristics of the generalised system of 
preferences  as  envisaged by  the  developed market  economy 
countries 
(&)  Legal  status 
12.  Tbe  legal status of the tariff preferences to be  accorded 
to the beneficiary countries  by  each preference-giving country 
individually will be  governed  by  the  following  considerations: 
(i)  the tariff preferences  are  temporary  in nature; 
(ii)  their grant  does  not constitute  a  binding  commitment 
and,  in particular,  it does  not  in any way  prevent 
(a)  their subsequent  withdrawal  in whole  or in 
part;  or 
(b)  the  subsequent  reduction of tariffs on  a  most-
favoured-nation basis,  whether unilaterally or 
following  international tariff negotiations; 
(iii)  their grant is conditional upon the necessary waiver 
or waivers  in respect of existing  international 
obligations,  in particular in the  G.A.T.T. C(69)142  - 6  -
(b)  Beneficiaries 
13.  As  for beneficiaries,  donor countries would  in general 
base  themselves  on  the principle of self-election(*).  With 
regard to this principle,  reference  should be  made  to the relevant 
paragraphs in document  TD/56,  i.e.  Section A  in Part I. 
(c)  Product  coverage 
14.  The  donor  countries  have  considered that the generalised 
tariff preferences  should apply in principle to all industrial 
semi-manufactures  and  manufactures.  Other products  could be 
included  on  a  case-by-case basis. 
15.  As  far  as  industrial semi-manufactures  and  manufactures 
are  concerned,  Chapters  25-99  of the Brussels Nomenclature  have 
been taken as  the basis  for the  coverage  of the preferential scheme. 
It was  also  decided that the prospective  donor  countries would 
indicate  in their submissions  what  treatment they were  prepared 
to give  to products  in Chapters  1-24.  These  products  were  to be 
presented in the  form  of  a  positive list.  Nine  out  of the ten 
submissions  received included such  a  list.  Ireland has  not 
submitted  one,  since it does  not  envisage granting preferences 
to  any products  in Chapters  1-24.  Processed  and  semi-processed 
agricultural products,  appearing  in Chapters  25-99  have  been 
in the  case  of  some  countries dealt with  in the  same  manner  as 
those products  in Chapters  1-24  of the  B.N. 
16.  There  was  a  wide  measure  of  agreement that the generalised 
scheme  of preferences  was  not  in principle  intended to  cover 
primary products.  It is,  however,  recognised that distinguishing 
primary  from  processed goods  raises delicate problems.  The  donor 
countries  recognised that there were  great difficulties in reaching 
general  agreement  on  the classification of products  on  or near the 
borderline.  When  drawing  up their initial lists,  some  donor 
countries have given  a  wider  interpretation to the  concepts  of 
processing than others.  It was  generally recognised that it 
might  be  possible for  some  categories  of products  in Chapters 
25-99  of the  B.N.  to  be  regarded as  primary products,  but it was 
not possible to  reach  a  consensus  on  the matter at this stage. 
17.  For  special reasons,  some  donor  countries have  included 
primary products  in their illustrative submissions.  It is 
nevertheless  recognised that the grant of preferences  in respect 
of  some  primary products  does  not provide  a  solution to all the 
existing problems  which  face these  products  on  the  international 
level. 
(*)  The  United  Kingdom  and  New  Zealand consider that all donor 
countries  should  adopt  the  self-election principle  in accordance 
with the  relevant paragraphs  in document  TD/56  and their 
submissions  were  based  on  the  expectation that this assumption 
would  prove  to  be  justified. - 7  - C(69)142 
(d)  Depth of tariff cut 
(1)  Chapters  25-99  of the  B.N.: 
18.  Some  countries  envisage  duty-free  imports.  These  are 
the E.E.C.,  the  Nordic  countries,  the United Kingdom  and the 
United States.  In principle,  Japan also  envisages duty-free 
imports.  In the  case  of selected products,  a  50  per cent tariff 
reduction of the post Kennedy  Round  m.f.n.  rate will be  applied. 
Other donor countries  would  introduce  linear tariff 
reductions falling  short  of duty-free  entry.  Ireland envisages 
reducing  the m.f.n.  rate of duty by  33  l/3 per cent.  Canada 
proposes  as  depth  of cut the  lower  of  (a)  33  1/3 per cent of the 
post Kennedy  Round  m.f.n.  rate  or  (b)  the British preferential 
tariff of Canada.  Austria  envisages  substantive linear reductions, 
the  amount  of which have  not yet been fixed.  Switzerland 
envisages  a  uniform  reduction.  The  linear system  envisaged is 
progressive.  The  rate of cut  - as  well  as  the measures  in which 
the  system could remain linear - will be  finalised after the 
coming  consultations.  New  Zealand  would  introduce variable 
preferential duties,  the  level of which would  in general be  the 
same  as that applied under the British preferential arrangement 
to all countries  of the  Commonwealth  preferential area.  For certain 
positions  they would  be  below that level,  and for certain other 
positions they would be  between the m.f.n.  duty and the British 
preferential rate. 
(2)  Chapters  l-24 of the  B.N.: 
19.  The  Nordic  countries,  the  United Kingdom  and the United 
States would grant duty-free  entry to  these  products  (in the  case 
of the United  Kingdom,  lesser reductions  would  apply to  a  few 
products).  The  other prospective donors  envisage variable tariff 
reductions  of the  following  magnitude:  E.E.C.:  variable  according 
to products;  Austria and  Switzerland:  variable rates,  up  to 
exemption  in certain cases;  Canada:  variable,  at least 25-30 
per cent  of post Kennedy  Round  m.f.n.  rate;  Japan:  variable, 
generally 20-50  per cent of post  Kennedy  Round  m.f.n.  rate; 
New  Zealand:  variable,  as  for products  in Chapters  25-99. 
(e)  Exceptions 
20.  The  provisional views  of the various  countries  on  excep-
tions  in Chapters  25-99  may  be  summarised  as  follows,  it being 
understood that all countries  reserve the right to  review their 
position in view of the proposals tabled by all donor  countries. 
21.  The  preliminary proposals  of the E.E.C.  do  not  provide 
for  exceptions;  a  very limited number  of exceptions  could 
however  be  introduced in the  light of the  consultations  which 
will take  place with other members  of the  O.E.C.D.  The  Nordic 
countries have  made  no  initial exceptions,  but  in the  light of 
offers by other donor  countries  they reserve their right to C(69)142  - 8  -
introduce  a  small number  of exceptions  for products  which  they 
consider particularly sensitive  and  for products  subject to 
revenue  duties.  Japan  envisages  no  exceptions  apart  from  the  case 
of hydrocarbons  which will have  to be  excluded because  of the 
fiscal character  of their customs  duties.  The  United Kingdom 
has  tabled a  list of exceptions  which  consists  of cotton textiles, 
of two  other items,  and  of products  on  which  revenue  duties  are 
levied.  In addition the offer of duty-free  entry on non-cotton 
textiles  (other than some  items)  and  on  iron and  steel products  is 
conditionalon equivalent  offers by  other  donor  countries.  Austria 
has  submitted an  exceptions list which  contains  certain cotton 
textiles  and  a  few products  subject to variable  and equalisation 
charges.  Switzerland envisages  a  very limited number  of exceptions 
based  on  the fiscal character of the duties or  on  the agricultural 
nature  of the products  concerned.  The  United States would  except 
textiles,  shoes  and petroleum and petroleum products.  The 
communication of  Canada lists categories  of products which  would 
be  excepted:  (a)  products,  the  exports to  Canada  of which are at 
the time  the preferential scheme  comes  into effect,  under restraint 
by  countries exporting these products  to  Canada;  and products 
in respect  of which  such restraints might  from  time  to  time  be 
requested by  Canada  while  the  scheme  is in effect;  (b)  products 
for which preferential margins  are  bound  against reduction unless 
the  countries  concerned agree  to  waive their contractural rights. 
Ireland has  tabled a  list of exceptions  whiGh,  in addition to 
certain products  on which  revenue  duties are  levied and specified 
textile goods,  contains  a  small number  of other sensitive products. 
On  account  of its special  economic  and  trade characteristics, 
New  Zealand has  tabled  a  positive list which  covers products 
included both in Chapters  l-24  and  in Chapters  25-99. 
(f)  Safeguard mechanisms 
22.  All  donor  countries provide  for certain safeguard mechanisms 
with regard to the preferences they  envisage granting  s6  as  to 
retain some  degree  of control  over the trade  which might  be 
generated by the  new  tariff advantages.  The  donor  countries 
reserve the right to make  changes  in the detailed application 
as  in the  scope  of their measures,  if such  should appear to  them 
to  be  necessary or useful.  In particular,  most  of them reserve 
the right to limit or withdraw entirely or partly some  of the 
tariff advantages granted if they consider such action necessary, 
either for  domestic  reasons  or to avoid unduly  injuring the  interests 
of third countries  concerned.  The  donor  countries  are prepared 
to declare that  such measures  would  remain  exceptional  and  would 
be  decided  on  only after taking  due  account  of the  aims  of the 
generalised system of preferences  and  the general interests of 
the developing  countries.  As  will be  seen in the  following 
paragraphs,  the  devices  used to bring about this result vary 
according  to the  system envisaged. 
23.  Certain countries provide  for  a  mechanism  including  an 
a  priori limitation formula under which quantitative ceilings 
might  be  placed  on the  amount  of preferential  imports  (E.E.C., 
Japan  and  Austria).  This  formula  would  represent the principal - 9  - C(69)142 
means  of safeguarding their interests and those  of third 
countries.  They might nevertheless have  recourse also to  escape 
type  measures,  at least for those  products  which are not  covered 
by the  a  priori limitation formula. 
24.  For those  countries  which  do  not  envisage  a  priori 
limitations  (these are the Nordic  countries,  the United States, 
the United Kingdom,  Switzerland,  Ireland,  Canada  and  New  Zealand), 
escape  type  measures  are the main  safeguards at their disposal. 
Of  course,  the overall  impact  of the preferences  extended by the 
various  donor  countries would  also be  influenced by  other features 
of the respective  schemes,  such as  the  depth of the tariff cuts 
and the  length of the  exception lists. 
25.  The  provisional  views  of the various  countries may  be 
summarised  as  follows: 
For the  E.E.C.  the  safeguard mechanism  for goods 
benefiting from  preferences  and falling  into Chapters  25-99  takes 
the  form  of a  system of ceilings  determined in advance.  Under 
this system goods  will be  imported,  and benefit from preferences, 
,up  to  a  ceiling in value  terms  to  be  calculated for  each·product 
on  a  basis common  to all products. 
Annual  ceilings will normally be  calculated in accordance 
with the  following  formula:  c.i.f. value  of imports  from 
developing  countries  (basic quota)  plus  5  per cent of the c.i.f. 
value  of  imports  from  other sources  (supplementary quota)(l). 
Subject to  improvements  in the basis of calculation after several 
years  of operation,  the basic quota will be  a  fixed  amount 
corresponding to  imports  in a  reference year.  The  supplementary 
quota will be  variable,  recalculated annually  on  the basis  of 
the latest available figures,  without,  however  this resulting 
in a  reduction in the ceiling. 
For processed agricultural products,  a  safeguard mechanism 
will apply. 
26.  Japan will grant preferences  on  goods  falling within 
Chapters  25-99  of the B.N.  up  to  a  celing calculated on the 
basis  of the value  or quantity of  im~orts from  beneficiaries 
in a  reference year  (the basic  quota)  plus  a  supplementary quota 
of 5  per  cent of the value  or quantity of imports  from  sources 
(1)  Among  the  cotton textiles covered by the  long-term Agreement, 
preference would be granted only to those  countries 
beneficiaries under the  system which participate in the 
long-term Agreement,  and then only by virtue of particular 
provisions  arrived at under the Agreement  or by bilateral 
arrangement. 
For coir and  jute products,  preferences are  envisaged  only 
under specific measures  to  be  arrived at with the  exporting 
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other than beneficiaries.  In the  case of selected products  a 
ceiling will be  the  basic  quota plus  a  supplementary quota  of 10 
per cent  of the  value  or quantity of imports  from  sources  other 
than beneficiaries.  As  to the processed agricultural products 
falling within Chapters  1-24 of the B.N.,  the  safeguard mechanism 
will be  of  an  escape  clause type. 
27.  Austria has  proposed  introducing  a  system of ceilings 
determined  1n  advance.  It would reserve the right to  suspend or 
withdraw the  application of the preferential duty  on  a  specific 
product  from all beneficiaries if the  imports  from  those  countries 
exceeded  a  level calculated on the basis of imports  from  the  same 
countries during  a  reference  period increased by  a  fixed percentage. 
The  Austrian authorities will elaborate  safeguard provisions 
later. 
28.  The  submission of the Nordic  countries gives  a  fairly 
detailed description of  a  safeguard provis1on similar to those 
contained in existing  international agreements  or  arrangements 
open to all donor  countries.  Briefly it provides: 
- that consultations  would  be  initiated with the  exporting 
country or countries  in cases where  a  product benefiting from 
the  special tariff system is imported  into the  donor  country 
in such quantities  or  such  circumstances that it disturbs 
or threatens to disturb the market; 
- that in cases  of urgent necessity the  donor  country could 
unilaterally introduce limitations to  imports  and/or  take 
measures  in the tariff field to limit  imports  causing 
disturbance  of its markets; 
- that imports  should not be  reduced to  a  level below that 
prevailing in a  reference period preceding the  disturbance, 
and  that the possibility should be  allowed of  a  reasonable 
increase  during the period of restriction; 
- that the  safeguard measures  should be  confined to those 
countries  whose  imports  are  causing  the  injury,  and  should 
be  temporary; 
- that consultations  should be held with the  exporters  affected, 
in the  international body  responsible  for  examining  the 
functioning  of the  system,  and with the  other O.E.C.D.  donor 
countries. 
29.  The  United Kingdom  envisages  the  establishment of safe-
guards  which  would  enable  the preferential tariff treatment  on 
particular products to  be  withdrawn  or modified. 
30.  Switzerland foresees  the  introduction of  a  safeguard 
mechanism  although the gradual nature  of the  system it envisages 
would make  the  need to  apply it rather unlikely. - ll- C(69)142 
31.  The  submission by  Ireland provides for unilateral with-
drawal  of  a  preference in cases where  the increase in imports 
causes or  threatens to  cause  serious injury to  domestic  producers. 
32.  Canada  envisages resort to  safeguard measures  to protect 
sensitive  domestic  industries  and  third country export interests. 
33.  The  United States proposal  envisages that a  standard 
escape  clause procedure would  be  necessary by  which preferences 
on  an  item could  be  reduced  or withdrawn  on grounds  that serious 
injury to  domestic  producers had occurred or was  threatening to 
occur. 
34.  New  Zealand envisages  that  a  safeguard mechanism  could 
be  invoked,  without  the obligation of prior consultation,  at 
the  request of  domestic  industries or exporting third countries. 
35.  Exclusion or  suspension mechanisms  are proposed  by the 
E.E.C.,  Japan and Austria.  Machinery  could be  devised under 
which  the limitations on imports  enjoying preferential treatment 
would  only apply,  for  a  given product,  to  those  exporting countries 
which  by  themselves  secure  a  considerable proportion of the 
market.  These  would  lose the  benefit of the preferential tariff 
for  any  exports  over  a  certain amount.  Such  a  mechanism  of 
exclusion  (or  suspension)  is justified in the  view of its pro-
ponents for three reasons.  This  would preserve opportunities for 
those  countries which  are at an earlier stage of development  and 
may  have  difficulty in securing access  to  a  market.  It may  also 
be  argued  that if a  particular industry in a  developing  country 
manages  to  win  a  large  share  of  a  market to  the  detriment of its 
competitors,  its products  are very competitive.  In this event 
the tariff advantages  granted to it are  no  longer justified. 
Finally,  these  are the  cases which  are likely to  be  the  most 
injurious  to industries in an importing  developed  country or to 
third countries.  The  argument  on which  the  E.E.C.,  Japanese 
and Austrian proposals  are based is that of  safeguarding the 
least developed  countries. 
36.  The  E.E.C.  envisages,  as  a  general rule,  limiting the 
preference granted to  each country to half of the  quota fixed 
for  each product.  Austria reserves the right to  suspend or 
withdraw the preference for  a  specific  country  and product when 
imports  from that country  exceed  a  certain amount  (fixed on the 
basis of a  reference period increased by  a  fixed percentage)  and 
if at the  same  time that country is the first or second develop-
ing country supplier of the product.  As  for Japan,  preferences 
will be  suspended if preferential imports of a  particular product 
from  a  given beneficiary exceed  50 per cent of the ceiling in 
the  course of a  year.  As  to  selected products,  in cases where 
the imports  of  a  certain product  from  a  given beneficiary exceed 
50 per cent of the ceiling in the latest year for which statistics 
are  available,  preferences will not  be  granted for that product 
from  the  said beneficiary in the  following year. C(69)142  - 12  -
(g)  Other h¥kotheses,  reservations  and conditions 
formula  ed  by  the prospective preference-granting 
countries 
37.  In addition to  the various  elements  summarised in the 
foregoing  paragraphs,  a  number  of countries mentioned certain 
conditions,  reservations or hypotheses which  should in their 
view be fulfilled before their offers  could be  finalised.  Their 
initial positions  could be  more  or less drastically modified 
in the light of the  solutions which are  found  to these various 
points. 
38.  One  of the  conditions most frequently mentioned is that 
the various  donor  countries must  be  satisfied that there is 
sufficient equivalence  between their offer and those of the 
other donor  countries.  This is the  concern for burden-sharing. 
39.  Japan would  consider the possibility of withholding 
the application of preferences to  countries other than those 
who  are  known  to  extend to her the non-discriminatory treatment 
on trade  and  are not invoking Article  XXXV  of the G.A.T.T. 
against her. 
40.  A condition which  the United Kingdom  attaches to their 
offer is that it will be  necessary for the  consent to  be  obtained 
of countries in the  Commonwealth  Preference  Area with trade 
agreement  rights to margins  of preference  on certain products to 
waive  these rights to the  extent required to enable preferences 
on these products  to  be  extended to  non-Commonwealth  developing 
countries.  The  fulfilment  of this condition does not,  of course, 
depend  only on the  donor  country concerned. 
41.  The  E.E.C.  has put forward its set of preliminary proposals 
subject to possible modifications which  could be  made  following 
consultations which  the  Community  is obliged to hold with  some 
associated countries in accordance with the provisions of the 
Association agreements. 
42.  The  more  general problem of relations between the  existing 
preferences  and  the new  generalised preferences will in any case 
arise before the latter are introduced.  This  is one  of the  aspects 
on which there  should be  consultation with the  developing  countries. 
Ja~an,  the Nordic  countries  and  Switzerland consider that 
generalise  preferences  should provide  equal tariff treatment 
for all developing  countries in donor  country markets.  The 
United Kingdom  and the E.E.Co  stress that there need be  no 
incompatibility between generalised preferences  and  special 
preferences.  They recall,  moreover,  that the  developing  countries 
presently receiving preferences  on their markets would  expect 
the  arrangements  to provide  them with increased export  oppor-
tunities  on  other markets  to  compensate  for their having to 
share  their present advantages with other developing  countries. 
The  United Kingdom,  Canada  and  New  Zealand attach importance  to 
this consideration in determining  the  generalised preferences they 
grant. - 13  - C(69)142 
43.  In the  view of several donor  countries  (Nordic  countries, 
Switzerland  and  Japan),  the abolition of reverse preferences is 
a  key  element in granting generalised preferences.  It was  noted 
that this was  a  question which  the  developed  countries  are unable 
to resolve by  themselves,  since  the  elimination or maintenance 
of reverse preferences  depends  on  decisions of the  countries 
granting those preferences in the light of their interest as 
affected,  inter alia,  by the  scheme  or  schemes  to be  instituted. 
44.  The  United States preference offer is premised upon  the 
adoption of  a  common  scheme  by all major  donor  countries and 
the  elimination of special preferences  on products  covered by 
the  scheme  and all reverse preferences.  The  United States noted 
that the  adoption by  the major  donor  countries of its proposal 
for duty free  entry,  without quantitative ceilings and  a  bare 
minimum  of exceptions,  would  automatically meet  the  condition 
regarding  special preferences,  and would provide  the maximum 
benefits for the  developing  countries. 
45.  The  other countries have  not at the outset required as  a 
condition for  implementing their own  method of granting preferences, 
the  adoption of that  same  method  by the  other donor countries. 
46.  The  Nordic  countries have  worked,  however,  on the hypothesis 
that the  aim  of the discussions in the O.E.C.D.  was  to  reach 
agreement  on  a  common  scheme. 
47.  The  E.E.C.  believes that it is not necessary that all 
donor  countries  should adopt  the  same  system of preferences, 
especially if it is desired that implementation of Resolution 21 
(II)  adopted at New  Delhi  should take place rapidly.  Indeed the 
E.E.C.  considers that all donor countries should make  the maximum 
effort by utilising the  mechanisms  best suited to  their specific 
positions. 
(h)  Introduction of the  system 
48.  Most  of the  donor  countries will introduce the preferential 
measures  they will have  decided upon in full,  and in one  stage. 
Some  countries,  however,  envisage  implementing their preferential 
tariff reductions  by  stages. 
(i) Duration 
49.  The  duration of the  scheme  of generalised preferences will 
be  fixed at ten years.  Independently of any periodic  reviews 
which might  also  be  agreed upon,  a  major  review will be held 
some  time  before  the  end  of the  ten-year period to  determine 
whether  the preferential system  should be  continued,  modified 
or abolished at the  end of the period. 
(j) Rules  of origin 
50.  The  introduction of generalised preferences will call for 
the application of satisfactory rules of origin.  For that 
reason the  UNCTAD  Special  Committee  on  Preferences at its 
second  session set up  a  special  Working  Party to  carry out C(69)142  - 14 -
consultations  on  the technical aspects of the rules of origin. 
The  Working  Party has  begun  a  study on the technical aspects 
of rules of origin.  This  Working  Party should pursue its 
activities.  It will in the  view of the  donor countries be 
necessary to have  rules of origin that meet  the  following require-
ments:  (a)  effectively ensure for the developing countries the 
advantages  of preferential treatment for those  exports which will 
qualify therefor;  (b)  allow for  a  simple  and reasonable  admini-
stration for both donor  and beneficiary countries;  (c)  avoid 
distortion of trade;  and  (d)  help to  ensure  the  equivalence 
in the  conditions of access  to the markets of the various 
industrialised countries.  Satisfactory functioning  of the rules 
of origin will be greatly helped if it is possible to  establish 
close  and  confident collaboration between the  competent  authori-
ties of the  donor  and beneficiary countries,  particularly con-
cerning documentation  and control. 
(k)  Institutional arrangements 
51A  Apart  from  consultations which  could take place bilaterally, 
through usual diplomatic  channels,  on  significant difficulties 
which may  arise  as  a  result of the preference  scheme  the opera-
tion of the  system will call for general reviews  and multilateral 
consultations on various  aspects of the measures  being  applied. 
52.  Without prejudice to what  may  be  decided upon in the 
G.A.T.To  when it considers the necessary waiver or waivers  from 
the provisions of the General  Agreement,  examination of the 
operation of the preferential arrangements  should be  carried 
out in an  appropriate  body  of the  UNCTAD.  The  donor  countries 
favour giving this task to  the  Committee  on  Manufactures, 
which is best placed to  examine  the effects of the preference&, 
taking into account all other aspects of trade in manufactures 
and  semi-manufactures. 
53.  It would  seem  appropriate that the reviews  of the function-
ing  and of the  effects of the  scheme  of generalised preferences 
should take place during  the  annual  sessions of that Committee. 
The  Committee  could also  carry on more  detailed examinations 
every three years,  as  the group  of 77  suggested at the  New  Delhi 
Conference(lJ,  or after five years.  The  reviews  should enable 
a  general  assessment to be  made  of the effects of the generalised 
preferences on international trade.  The  reviews  would  also 
provide  an opportunity for multilateral consultations between 
the  donor  countries  and  the  developing  countries,  on  the  system 
as  initially applied,  on the modalities of its application,  and 
on  subsequent  changes,  which the  donor  countries may  have  intro-
duced.  In particular,  the  donor  countries consider that the 
effects of the  application of  safeguard mechanisms  might be 
the  subject of review on the  occasion of these consultations. 
(1)  See  document  TD/II/C.2/LQ5,  paragraph 12. - 15  - C(69)142 
54.  Lastly,  as was  suggested above,  a  detailed examination 
should take place before the  end of the ten-year period with a 
view to determining whether the generalised preferences should 
be  continued,  modified or abolished. 
* 
*  * 
III.  Actions by developed countries with centrally planned 
economies  and  developing  countries 
55.  O.E.C.D.  Member  countries have not given any  further 
consideration to the question of what  corresponding efforts 
ought to  be  made  by  developed countries with centrally planned 
economies  and the  complementary measures that might be  taken 
by developing countries.  Their general views  on this question, 
however,  remain as  expressed in the report circulated to the 
UNCTAD  under reference TD/56. I~/- 17 - C(69)142 
ANNEXES 
Individual submissions  by  the countries which are 
considering granting preferences 
These  submissions  are being distributed as  separate 
Annexes.  For  each one,  the text in the original language 
in which the  submission was  deposited should alone  be  considered 
as authentic.  Translations into the other working languages 
will have  only an unofficial value. 
The  submissions are reproduced in the  Annexes  as 
follows: 
Annex  1  European Economic  Community 
Annex  2  Nordic  countries  (Denmark,  F·inland,  Norway, 
Annex  3  Austria 
Annex  4  Canada 
Annex  5  United States 
Annex  6  Ireland 
Annex  7  Japan 
Annex  8  United Kingdom 
Annex  9  Switzerland 
Annex  10  New  Zealand 
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